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SOME SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF BOOM TOWNS
RONALD L. LITTLE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Both the history and myths of the American West have contrib-
uted to the contemporary view of boom towns.' The popular con-
ception of Virginia City, Nevada, and Leadville, Colorado, for in-
stance, is that they and other towns like them were wide-open and
free, with few restrictions placed on individual prerogatives. Another
misconception is that formal social control mechanisms such as po-
lice and courts were either absent or ineffectual. Nevertheless good
(with the aid of a few dedicated citizens) always triumphs over
evil in such fantasies. These notions, while inaccurate, are at least
consistent with the generally held American belief that hard work
conquers adversity.
Unfortunately, romantic images of boom towns fostered by mov-
ies and television are at odds with current reality. Communities such
as Conrad, Forsyth and Colstrip, Montana; Center, North Dakota;
Rock Springs and Green River, Wyoming; and Page, Arizona, tes-
tify to their decidely unromantic nature. For example, after study-
ing boom growth in Rock Springs and Green River, Wyoming, Gil-
more concluded: "The energy boom town in the western United
States is apt to be a bad place to live. It's apt to be a bad place to
do business. ' '2
Before discussing the issues and problems associated with boom
growth, it is necessary to examine the factors which determine
whether or not a community should be classified as a boom town.
Any difficulty in identifying an extant boom town is primarily con-
ceptual rather than empirical. Even untrained observers can read-
ily identify most communities suffering from the boom syndrome;
it is only in marginal instances that conceptual clarification is nec-
essary for identification after the boom phenomenon has occurred.
However, conceptual rigor is essential if boom communities are to
* Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, Utah State University; B.S., 1963,
University of Utah; Ph.D., 1971, University of Oregon.
The research reported in this paper was supported in part by grant number EnV
76-04849 to the Sociology Subproject of the Lake Powell Research Project from the Re-
gional Environmental Systems Program of Research Applied to National Needs (RANN)
of the National Science Foundation..
1. See generally Gurian, The Make-up of a Mining Town, 4 JOUR. OF THE WEST 97
(1965) ; Lavender, Thie Wondrous Town: This Instant City, 4 AMER. WEST 4 (1967);
Mann, The Decade After the Gold Rush: Social Structure in Grass Valley and Nevada City,
California, 1950-1960, 41 PAc. I-LIST. REV. 448 (1972).
2. Gilmore, Boom Towns May Hinder Energy Development, 191 SCIENCE 535, 535 (1976).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
be identified prior to their inception in order that plans may be de-
veloped and implemented to avoid the phenomenon.
II. THE NATURE OF BOOM TOWNS
Besides increased economic activity, the most distinguish-
ing characteristic of boom towns is an accelerated population
growth. The source of this growth typically stems from external
economic pressures seeking to develop some local resource, social or
natural.3 Rapid population growth in turn leads to a breakdown in
municipal services and other institutional facets of the commu-
nity.4 Planning lags behind needs, and control of the community
seems to rest with forces outside the immediate environs. Em-
pirical evidence provides no clear-cut indicator of the point at
which these breakdowns occur. Most communities can probably
absorb an annual population growth rate of 5%,5 but they cannot
absorb, without a great many problems, an annual population growth
rate in excess of 15%.6 It would seem safe to infer, then, that as a
community's annual rate of population growth approaches 10%, se-
vere institutional malfunctioning has already begun or is about to
begin.
Boom town growth rates (10% to 15% annually) generally re-
sult from one or more related industries entering an underpop-
ulated area at the same time. The new industries are usually re-
lated since it is highly unlikely that several small industries would
begin dissimilar projects at the same time in the same locale.
Problems of obtaining a construction work force, facilities for em-
ployees, and project financing would work against such an even-
tuality. Historically, boom towns were associated to a large ex-
tent with the extraction and processing of mineral deposits. The
contemporary scene is similar.7 Coal, oil, and uranium have pro-
vided the impetus for most contemporary booms, at least in the
western United States.
Because the breakdown of local community services and struc-
tures can be attributed to unusually high population growth rates,
3. See B. Ives, W. Schultze & D. Brookshire. Boomtown Impacts of Energy Develop-
ment In the Lake Powell Region (1976) (Lake Powell Research Project Bull. No. 28, In-t.
of Geophysics & Planetary Physics, U.C.L.A.).
4. See Gilmore, supra note 2, at 535-40.
5. J. GILMORE & M. DUFF, BOOM TOWN GROWTH MANAGEMENT: A CASE STUDY OF ROCK
SPRINGS--GREEN RIVER, WYOMING 2 (1975).
6. See Gilmore, supra note 2, at 536.
7. See J. GILMORE & M. DUFF, supra note 5. See also- MOUNTAIN WEST RESEARCH, INC.
(MWRI), CONSTRUCTION WORKER PROFILE: FINAL PROFILE (1975) (prepared for the Old
Vest Regional Comm'n) ; Nellis, What Does Energy Development Mean for Wyoming,
33 HUMAN ORG. 229-38 (1974) ; U.S. Bureau of Mines (USBM) & Envt'l Protection Agency(EPA), A Listing of Proposed, Planned or Under Construction Energy Projects in Federal
Region VIII: A Joint Report (1975) (mimeograph prepared by the Subcomm. to Expedite
Energy Devel., Bur. of Mines, and the Socio-Economic Impacts of Nat. Resource Devel.
Comm., Envt'l Protection Agency).
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it follows that boom conditions will seldom be found in large met-
ropolitan areas. Even a new industry that would add 20,000 per-
sons to a large urban community such as Chicago would be un-
likely to strain the existing social structures. Despite the magni-
tude of the increase in absolute numbers, -it would represent only
a small percentage population increase which existing structures
could absorb without undue strain.
Small rural communities, however, lack the capability to ab-
sorb relatively large demands upon their municipal services. It
can, therefore, be expected that the boom phenomenon all too fre-
quently Will be observed in communities that are the least well-
equipped to cope with it. Furthermore, rural communities typi-
cally have antiquated or seriously strained public facilities even
prior to the additional stress created by the location of new in-
dustries in the town. Energy developments in Hanna" and Gil-
lette, Wyoming,9 provide vivid examples of the stress faced by
rural areas experiencing rapid population growth. In fact, avail-
able evidence leads to the conclusion that rural western commu-
nities will definitely experience the boom phenomenon in the next
decades unless comprehensive planning is carried out and implement-
ed.10
The Arab oil embargo of 1973 to 1974, together with assorted
economic and political events, has pushed American government
and industry toward a national goal of energy self-sufficiency. 1
Major energy reserves of coal, oil, natural gas, uranium, tar sands,
oil shale, and geothermal resources are located in the sparsely
populated areas of the Northern Great Plains12 and Rocky Moun-
tains.'1 3 Even without a push for national energy self-sufficiency,
the diminishing supply of imported oil and continuing growth in
America would eventually lead to the extraction and processing of
these vast reserves. To further compound the problem, several
pieces of federal legislation, such as the Rural Development Act
of 1972,'14 are facilitating the redistribution westward of the urban
population of the eastern seaboard and the Midwest. 15 The end re-
S. See Nellis, supra note 7.
9. See A. BLEVINS, J. THOMPSON & C. ELLIS, SOCIAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF CAMPBELL
COUNTY, WYOMING (1974) (Wyo. Envt'l Inst., Laramie, Wyo.).
10. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVEL. (HUD), RAPID GROW'TH FROM
ENERGY PROJECTS: IDEAS FOR STATE AND LOCAL ACTION: A PROGRAM GUIDE (1976).
11. See Cockburn & Ridgeway, Energy and the Politicians, 23 N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS 19-25
(1976) ; Mont. Dep't of Nat. Resources and Conservation, National Energy Self-Suffi.
ciency: Its Viability and Implications for Montana, 1 WESTERN WILDLANDS 6-15 (1974).
12. See Josephy, Agony of the Northern Plains, AUDUBON, July 1937, at 68.
13. D. Carey, J. Wegner, 0. Anderson, G. Weatherford & P. Perkins, Kalparowits Hand.
book: Coal Resources (1975) (Lake Powell Research Project Interim Rep., Inst. of Geo.
physics & Planetary Physics, U.C.L.A.). See also USBM & EPA, supra note 7.
14. Pub. L. No. 92-419, 86 Stat. 657 (codified in scattered, sections of 5. 7, 16, 42
U.S.C.).
15. *See P. MORRISON, S. MAZIE, R. PAINEY, S. PRUNELL, H. BOISSEVAIN & S. COLEMAN,
RP VIEw OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS TO ALLEVIATE RURAL DEPRIVATION (1974) (prepared for the
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sult of this predicted activity may make the Northern Great Plains
and the Rocky Mountain region the Boom Capital of the United
States. This would be a distinction few communities would wel-
come.1 6
III. BOOM TOWN PROBLEMS
A. ECONOMIC FACTORS
When an area is suddenly faced with large population increases
resulting from industrial projects, the economic factors are usually
considered most important and receive the most attention from city,
county and state officials. Likewise, federal officials charged with
evaluating a broad range of socio-economic impacts in environmen-
tal impact statements (EIS's) 7 often give undue attention to econom-
ic factors to the relative exclusion of equally important social fac-
tors.' This tendency can be explained in part by the American com-
mitment to the spirit of capitalism. Further, economic problems,
unlike many social problems, become immediately evident. There is
very little delay between the onset of the new population and the
economic costs of providing community services for these new resi-
dents. Many social factors, on the other hand, are not observed un-
til some time after the influx of new residents, and some factors
may be observed only by trained social scientists. The effects of
these social factors, however, are experienced by all, even if often
unnoticed by the populace. Finally, since economic costs and bene-
Edna McConnell Clark Found.: R-1651-CF, Rand Corp.); G. SUMMERS, S. EVANS, F.
CLEMENTE, E. BECK & J. MINKOFF, INDUSTRIAL INVASION OF NONMETROPOLITAN AMERICA:
A QUARTER CENTURY OF EXPERIENCE (1976) ; Nolan & Hefferman, The Rural Development
Act of 1972: A Skeptical View, 39 RURAL SOC. 536-45 (1974) ; G. Summers, Nonmetro
Industrial Growth: Wants and All (1975) (Center for Applied Sociology, Univ. of Wise.).
16. See FsED. OF ROCKY MTN. STATES, RESOURCE CITY, ROCKY MOUNTAINS (1974) (Den-
ver, Colo.) ; NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS RESOURCES PROG., EFFECTS OF COAL DEVELOPMENT IN
THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAINS: A REVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES AND CONSEQUENCES AT' DIFFERENT
RATES OF DEVELOPMENT (1975) (Denver, Colo.).
17. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, § 102(2)(C), 83
Stat. 852, 853 (codified In 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970)), provides in part that the
following matters must be discussed in an EIS:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(it) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented,
(iII) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resourues which
would be Involved in the proposed action should it be implemented....
18. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR (USDI), FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATE-
MENT: KAIPAROWITS PROJECT (1976); USDI, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
NAVAJO-EXXON URANIUM DEVELOPMENT (1976) ; USDI, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT: PROPOSED COAL GASIFICATION PROJECT AND EXPANSION OF NAVAJO MINE BY
UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC. (1976); USDI, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT:
KAIPAROWITS PROJECT (1975) ; USDI, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: WESTERN
GASIFICATION Co. (WESCO) COAL GASIFICATION PROJECT AND EXPANSION OF NAVAJO MINE
BY UTAH INTERNATIONAL, INC. (1974).
Social factors have been found to be a necessary element of an EIS. See Chelsea
Neighborhood Ass'ns v. United States Postal Service, 389 F. Supp. 1171 (D.C.N.Y. 1975).
aff'd, 516 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1975).
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fits are readily quantifiable, efforts to comply with the apparent
mandates of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) ,9 as well as evaluation by local officials, are simplified.
1. Business taxes
The economic aspects of boom conditions are generally examined
In terms of new taxes generated and the concomitant costs for in-
creased social services. The latter include increased capital and op-
erating expenditures for: (1) education; (2) water and sewer; (3)
fire and police protection; (4) health care facilities; and (5) trans-
portation systems. If reasonable population projections can be ob-
tained, 20 costs for increased public services can be estimated prior
to the population flood in a relatively simple and straightforward
manner.
Even though estimates of population growth do not represent an
insurmountable obstacle, estimates of increased tax revenues for any
given project may prove more difficult. Contingencies associated
with construction and projection schedules, as well as fluctuations
in local mill levies and property valuations, make accurate apprais-
als difficult. Furthermore, in some instances the tax revenues are
collected by one taxing unit, whereas the increased population and
therefore increased municipal services are located elsewhere. Many
times equity and justice require that legislative action be taken to
remedy the situation. To rectify the imbalance, the creation of spe-
cial service districts, the pre-payment of taxes by industry, or the
establishment of special state revenue sharing plans may be neces-
sary. The State of North Dakota, for example, enacted a coal sev-
erance tax 21 and an accompanying impact aid program in 1975.22
The impact aid program provides the coal-producing counties with
a direct rebate of a portion of the coal tax revenue.2 3 However, in
19. NEPA, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4947
(1970), as amended, (Supp. V 1975)). For the matters that must be cuscussedi in an ELS.
see note 17 supra.
20. See HUD, supra note 10, at 3-9.
21. Ch. 563, §§ 1-10 [1975J N.D. Sess. Laws 1476-79 (codified In N.D. CENT. COD ch.
57-61 (Supp. 1975)).
22. Id. §§ 11-14, at 1479-80 (codified In N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 57-62 (Supp. 1975)).
23. Id. § 12, at 1479 (codified in N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-62-02 (Supp. 1975)), provides
In part:
Moneys deposited in the coal development fund shall be apportioned quar-
terly by the state treasurer as follows:
1. Thirty-five percent shall be credited to a special fund in the state
treasury for distribution through grants by the coal development Impact
office to cities, counties, school districts and other taxing districts, subject
to appropriation by the legislative assembly.
3. Five percent shall be allocated to the coal-producing counties and
shall be distributed among such counties in such proportion as the number
of tons of coal severed in the state during such quarterly period. Such allo-
cations shall be credited to the county general fund.
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extreme cases, amendments to state constitutions may provide the
only solution.24
Unfortunately, sought after increased tax revenues sometimes
fall short of the costs of increased services. Hawkes, in a study of
energy development in Colstrip, Montana, has indicated that the
taxes paid by Montana Power did not cover even the increased
school costs, aside from the costs of other impacts.2 5 A similar con-
clusion seems justified from data presented in a draft EIS for a ura-
nium development on the Navajo Reservation.2 6
More commonly, however, studies 27 indicate that tax revenues
do eventually cover the expense of improved facilities, despite a con-
siderable time lag between incurring additional costs and receiving
increased tax revenues sufficient to pay for the improvements. For
example:
The Wyoming Select Committee on Industrial Development
Impacts analyzed time required to balance costs and reve-
nues and concluded that school districts would balance in one
year after completion of the project, counties in three years,
but that cities would take 25 years to balance. 8
Aside from direct costs of the improvements, there are interest costs
for which the time lag deficit could reach, into the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars. Thus, even though most energy projects will even-
tually pay for the increased community services required because of
population growth, city, county, and/or state governments must
carry a considerable tax burden between the onset of the community
service needs and the time when tax revenues catch up. Energy proj-
ects typically entail a lag time of from five to ten years between
the beginning of construction and the beginning of operations, when
tax revenues increase dramatically. Thus, the period during which
local government units must shoulder excessive improvement costs
is relatively long. Until revenues match costs, industry is in effect
being subsidized by the local population.
2. Personal taxes
Apart from taxes generated by industry, additional problems are
As of July 1, 1977, under recently enacted legislation, the percentage of coal tax revenues
allocated directly to the producing counties will be raised from 5% to 20%, with the added
stipulation that 40% of that allocation go directly to the county general fund, 30% to the
incorporated cities in the county, and 30% to the school districts in the coulty. H.B. 1262,
45th N.D. Leg. Assem. (1977).
24. See WILSON, MANAGING A GROWTH EXPLOSION (1976) (Third Biennial Rep. to
Cong.) : HUD, supra notp 10.
25. Hawks, Units 3 and 4 at Colstrip, 1 WESTERN WILDLANDS 29-32 (1974).
26. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR (USDI), DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTr:
NAVAJO-EXXON URANIUM DEVELOPMENT (1976). For criticism see USDI, FINAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: NAVAJO-EXXON URANIUM DEVELOPMENT 1-12 (1976).
27. E.g., HUD, supra note 10.
28. HUD, oupra note 10, at 29.
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encountered because of increased property taxes born by local prop-
erty owners. Although it is frequently argued that the increased
tax base created by industrial developments will relieve the tax bur-
den, this is not always the case.- Since energy development inevi-
tably increases local property valuation, taxes will increase even if
tax rates remain the same. The effect is especially damaging to
the elderly, those on fixed incomes, and those whose salaries or
wages have not kept pace with the higher wages of the employees
of the new industry. 30
Finally, there is the danger faced by the permanent residents
in communities undergoing rapid industrialization. It is entirely pos-
sible that bond issues necessary to finance improved services may
outlive the industry. In such instances, taxes are forced even higher
as the population dwindles after the close of the industry. Sweet
Home, Oregon, is one such community that was left with unretired
municipal bonds after the construction personnel for a dam project
moved from the community. 3 1 In the excitement and confusion sur-
rounding new projects and rapid population growth, planners and
citizens alike must remain alert to these potential problems.
B. SOCIAL FACTORS3 2
Although the various economic problems resulting from the boom
phenomenon have social consequences, strictly speaking, these prob-
lems are not in and of themselves social. Analytically, economic
and social issues must be kept distinct. The economic realm is more
appropriately conceived of as, exterior to the social environment,
much like the natural environment is exterior to the social environ-
ment. Alterations in either the economic or natural environments,
however, have consequences for the social environment. For exam-
ple, 3 if the coal supplying the Jim Bridger Power Plant near Rock
29. See, e.g., Gold, How Southeastern Montanans View the Coal Development Issue,
1 WESTERN WILDLANDS 16-20 (1975) ; Hawks, supra note 19; D. Derr & V. Casper, Urbani-
zation and Its Effects on Land Use Local Services and Public Finance (1970) (Economic
Info. Rep., Dep't of Agricultural Econ., Rutgers Univ.) ; P. Polzin, Water Use and Coal
Development in Eastern Montana (1974) (Joint Water'Resources Research Center, Mon-
tana State Univ., Bozeman, Mont.).
30. See, e.g., Clemente & Summers, Industrial Development and the Elderly: A Longi-
tudinal Analysis, 28 JOUR. OF GERONTOLOGY 479-83 (1973) ; Gold, supra note 29; Hawks,
supra note 25; S. Albrecht, Sociological Aspects of Power Plant Siting (1972) (unpublished
paper, Brigham Young Univ.).
31. Smith, Hogg & Regan, Effects of Industrial Development on Heads of Households,
14 GROWTH AND CHANGE 16-19 (1973) ; Smith, Hogg & Regan, Economic Development:
Panacea or Perplexity for Rural Areas? 35 RURAL SOC. 173-S6 (1971).
32. Psychologists may wish to claim that some of the problems discussed in this section
are not social, but rather psychological. Technically, of course, this claim would be ac-
curate. However, inasmuch as the consequences of psychological disorders are intimately
linked to the social structure, both psychological and social problems will be discussed
together.
33. For reasons previously discussed, and given current planning procedures, It Is
assumed for convenience that major energy projects Imply boom conditions In a rural
atmosphere.
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Springs, Wyoming, were to become depleted, a wise economic deci-
sion might require closure of the plant. The resultant social conse-
quences would include a jobless work force, with some employees
thrust onto the welfare rolls and others forced to gather up their
families and move on to another similar project. Conversely, changes
-in the social structure34 may alter the patterns in the natural
and economic environments. Thus, the systems are interdependent
and a change in any system will result in changes in the others.
It appears evident that many potential social problems might
result from the large population influxes associated with massive
energy projects. Yet both the popular media and, more importantly,
the public decision-making documents give them only the most cur-
sory attention.3 5 It should be emphasized that both recognition and
proper analysis of social considerations are absolutely critical if an
understanding of the boom phenomenon is to be attained.
Because the social environment of a boom town is so varied, it
will be impossible to discuss all of the possible relevant issues in
this article. Some of the issues are still only imperfectly understood.
For other issues, good empirical evidence is lacking. For these rea-
sons, only a few of the more critical and better understood social
considerations will be discussed.
1. Mental health
Although perhaps the least well-developed body of literature deal-
ing specifically with boom problems is in the area of personal ad-
justments to the stresses and strains of dwelling in a boom com-
munity, some important, and perhaps startling, behaviors have been
observed. In an extensive study of Gillette, Wyoming, Kohrs has
abstracted his experiences and vividly portrayed a typical scene:
A housewife, after fighting mud, wind, inadequate water and
disposal systems, a crowded mobile home and muddy chil-
dren all day, snaps at her husband as he returns from a 16-
hour shift. He responds by heading back downtown and spend-
ing the night at a bar drinking and trading stories with men
from similar circumstances3 6
The Gillette Syndrome, as this behavior pattern is frequently referred
to, is not uncommon in boom towns. In addition to the problems
of inadequate municipal facilities, recreational outlets and housing,
boredom for wives and extreme work-related stress for husbands
34. "Social structure" refers to patterned behaviors, at both the personal and institu-
tional levels.
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 18.
36. E. Kohrs, Social Consequences of Boom Growth in Wyoming (1974) (unpublished
paper. Univ. of Wyoming).
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contribute to the syndrome. Manifestations of the strains induced
include high unemployment, absenteeism and turnover.3 7 Thus, boom
conditions also create problems for industry.
More serious symptoms of the boom experience are also evidenced
by alarmingly high instances of divorce, depression, alcoholism
and attempted suicide. 8 The ratio of marriages to divorces in Gil-
lette, Wyoming, was 1.8: 1, while in a nearby county the ratio was
3.3: 1, nearly twice as great.3 9 The extent of alcoholism is reflected
by the fact that almost twenty-three percent of the county arrests
were drinking-related. 40 The jail became a holding pen to restrain
drunks and protect wives from their husbands.
More tragic is the effect that boom town living had upon the
children. Schools provided the stage for their dramas. Gillette stu-
dents demonstrated poor adjustment to the school. Low achievement
levels accompanied by truancy and high deliquency rates were'ob-
served.41 In Forsyth, Montana, which is also undergoing energy de-
velopment, Gold observed a large increase in the number of assaults
and cases of venereal disease among students.42
The general conslusion from these studies is that the social milieu
of boom towns is not conducive to good mental health. The fact
that the Southwest Counseling Service, Rock Springs Mental Health
Center, saw an almost ninety percent increase in cases between
1970 and 1975 provides additional support for this conclusion.4 3
Merely improving municipal facilities, however, will not prevent
the occurrence of similar consequences in other boom towns. Part
of the solution must be found by addressing the psychological prob-
lems created by over-crowding. But, a more important causal var-
iable resides in the transformation of the existing social structure
into something new. Because uf the rapid population growth rate,
a new social structure is superimposed upon an old one, and until
a new equilibrium is, attained, many forms of conflict are likely
to be observed.
2. Value ronflicts
Values can be conveniently thought of as abstract standards for
37. B. Ives, W. Schultze & D. Brookshire, supra note 3. See also J. GILMORE & M. DuFFp
aupra note 5.
38. Unsuccessful suicides were the rule rather than the exception In Gillette. Kohre
relates this to the need to regulate the lack of human concern, rather than viewing them
as merely clumsy attempts. The purpose of the attempts was to dramatize problems-




42. R. Gold, Social Impacts of Strip Mining and Other Industrializations of Coal Re-
sources (n.d.) (unpublished paper, Inst. of Social Science Research, Univ. of Montana).
43. MWRI, supra note 7, at 55.
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behavior which are shared by groups or subgroups of a society. As
such, they are general principles by which persons and groups eval-
uate alternative behaviors. The sources of values are often found in
religious doctrines, regional and/or national traditions, or unique
personal histories.
The manner in which values are interpreted in given social sit-
uations and the degree to which they are held in common by mem-
bers of a geographically bounded community varies. Rural commu-
nities are surprisingly homogeneous and relatively conservative in
both their value orientations and their interpretations of these values.
In contrast, in-migrants to energy developments are decisively more
varied in their value orientations and considerably more liberal in
their applications thereof. Evidence of such differences can be in-
ferred from the fact that in-migrants tend to be from urban areas,
are younger and better educated, have fewer children, and are bet-
ter paid than their rural counterparts. 4 4
Given these differences, it is clear that the potential for value
conflicts and eventual change is large. Both Turner 5 and Smith
46
have noted that rural values change as the communities modernize
or become more urban. One of the obvious changes brought about
by the boom phenomenon of energy development is urbanization, in-
dicating that rural value orientations will change in that direction,
perhaps after a period of conflict.
Even strongly supported religious tenets are not immune to
such shifts. Smith found that urbanization brought with it relaxa-
tion in Mormon (Latter-Day Saints) adherence to a strict dietary
code, particularly taboos on smoking and drinking. The more urban
the experience, the less orthodox in behavior the Mormons were.4 7 The
implications for energy states with large Mormon populations like
Utah, and to a lesser degree Arizona, New Mexico, and Wyoming,
seems clear: energy development may seriously threaten adherence
to religious dogma. Other religious groups will undoubtedly face simi-
lar threats, with the degree of threat related to the particular tenets of
each creed. From the perspective of some religionists, therefore,
moral decay may be a likely outcome of energy development in the
Rocky Mountains and Northern Great Plains.
3. Personal interaction patterns
One of the least obvious structural dislocations that may occur in
boom towns involves shifts in friendship patterns. Friends who dis-
44. Id.; Nellis, supra note 7.
45. Turner, Patterns of Value Change During Economic Development: An Empirical
Study, 30 HUMAN ORa. 126-36 (1971).
46. Smith, The Urban Threat to Mormon Norms, 24 RURAL Soc. 355.61 (1959).
47. Id.
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agree on the merits of energy developments, or on the means
for overcoming the resultant local problems, may become ene-
mies. On the other hand, 'many individuals who have nothing
in common prior to the boom may develop strong friendships. Per-
sonal interaction patterns will thus fluctuate as a result of econom-
ic and social factors over which local residents have little or no
control. In an ethnographic study of coal development in eastern Mon-
tana, Gold found that a merchant-rancher alliance disintegrated as
the population increased.48 Merchants were reaping the economic
benefits of increased retail trade, while their old friends, the ranch-
ers, were fighting to maintain their livelihood and way of life. As
a result, friendships between ranchers and merchants dissolved and
new friendships between merchants and the energy industry evolved.
More subtle consequences of economic shifts have also been
observed in rural areas. While many justify energy developments
because of anticipated increased incomes for local residents it should
be noted that not all residents will share equally in the economic
boom. Even when income is increased, women and the elderly do
not fare as well as other segments of the community. 49 Thus, in
some respects economic growth provides the means for increased
social stratification in a community. The elderly and female may
lose status. This loss of status may then have a significant effect on
friendship patterns, since friends tend to possess similar social sta-
tuses.
Even if old friends do not become fast enemies, there is al-
ways the potential for conflict between the oldtimers and the new-
comers. The basis for these conflicts is found in the different value
and cultural orientations of the two groups. Local prices and serv-
ices ,as well as local customs and laws, may create animosity. In a
state like Utah, a simple issue such as local liquor laws could easily
serve as stimulus for hostility toward coal miners who will migrate
in as coal reserves are exploited.
Antagonisms need not develop only within the community, but
may stretch beyond the local environment. An example of conflict
which extends beyond community boundaries has recently been ob-
served in southern Utah where the proposed Kaiparowits power
project was to be built.50 Local boosters for the project have ac-
tively sought to negate the activities of those who opposed the facil-
ity, blaming them for its apparent demise. When the companies
withdrew from the project, a rally was held in Kanab, Utah, where
48. Gold, supra note 29 ; R. Gold, supra note 42.
49. Clemente, Effects of Industrial Development on Heads of Households: Comment,
14 GROWTH AND CHANGE 20-21 (1973); Clemente & Summers, supra note 30. See aso E.
Kohrs, supra note 36 ; G. Gold, supra note 42.
50. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: KAIPARO-
WITS PROJECT, at IX-447 to IX-816 (1976).
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those perceived as active opponents of the project were hung in ef-
figy. Media accounts of these events led to the conclusion that
the observed behavior represented more than a mere public demon-
stration.
This discussion is not intended to evaluate the appropriateness
of either group's behavior, but rather to point out that the poten-
tial for conflict and hostile interactions is present even when the indi-
viduals or groups involved do not reside in the same community. En-
ergy developments are apt to create numerous conflicts before agree-
ment is finally reached upon how the government ought to proceed
with respect to a particular project.
4. Institutional interaction patterns
Changing friendship patterns and the establishment of con-
flict boundaries can also influence the structural arrangements in
voluntary organizations such as community service and recreational
groups. For example, it becomes difficult to participate in a bridge
or literary club if past friendships with members of the group have
vanished. Reduced activities in voluntary groups create more prob-
lems for wives than for husbands and for in-migrants than for
locals. Wives of in-migrants to boom towns especially seem to suffer
from boredom due to the lack of recreational activities and friends. 51
At the same time that conflict boundaries change friendship pat-
terns, they often will provide the basis for the creation of interest
groups. For example, a group has been organized in southern Utah
(ALIVE) whose main purpose is to promote energy development
in general and the Kaiparowits Plateau coal reserves in particular.
Ideologically at least, the group is opposing various environmental
groups such as the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund,
ALIVE has also been involved in lobbying activities in Washington,
D.C., for the currently defunct Kaiparowits power project.
Special interest groups such as ALIVE, as well as in-migrants
with no recognizable organizational structure, could easily alter the
existing political and influence structures in boom communities.
With reference to formal political structures, Nellis has noted that as
a result of energy developments in Hanna, Wyoming, the size of the
Democratic majority was drastically reduced, but the Republican
Party increased its ranks only approximately one percent. Instead,
the shift which occurred was to the ranks of the Independents. 52
Similar consequences might be expected if large-scale coal
production materializes in predominantly Republican southern Utah.
For example, if a project the size of the proposed Kaiparowits de-
51. See Gilmore, supra note 2 ; E. Kohrs, supra note 36.
52. Nellis. supra note 7.
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velopment were to be undertaken in the Kane or Garfield County
area of Utah, roughtly 20,000 new residents would descend upon two
counties whose combined population in 1970 was less than 6,000. Coal
miners as a group are predominantly Democrats. If the Hanna, Wyo-
ming, model holds true, then the in-migrating coal miners are likely
to vote either Democratic or Independent. As political power and phi-
losophic dominance shifts away from the local residents, the results
could be politically devastating. Municipal as well as county ordi-
nances could be readily altered. County seats could possibly be moved
to new boom towns, thereby denying extant county seats their tra-
ditional sources of income, pride, and convenience.
On a less formal level, political control, exhibited by leadership
in various voluntary organizations, would also likely shift to the in-
migrants. Andrews and Bauder have observed this occurrence to
some extent in a rural Ohio county undergoing an industrialization
process not nearly as massive as the proposed western energy de-
velopments. 53 Even with the smaller influx of population, new-
comers in this rural county tended to occupy leadership positions for-
merly held by oldtime residents and the number of power groups tend-
ed to increase. This shift in political control occurred despite the
fact that most of the industry management resided out of the county.
Gold has also noted a shift in the power base from ranchers to in-
dustrial personnel in eastern Montana. 5
4
It should be stressed that conscious, organized takeovers of lo-
cal politics by newcomers provide only a partial explanation for shift-
ing political power. In addition, the numerical majority enjoyed by
newcomers in boom towns makes it highly probable that they will
be nominated for -office in greater numbers than oldtimers. Many of
the energy industry's executives will be popular with voters because
they possess skills that are relatively rare in rural areas and have
experience in dealing with boom town problems. Finally, oldtimers
holding political office at the time of the boom are faced with prob-
lems few are capable of dealing with. As problems arise, public in-
dignation follows, and the blame is placed upon the incumbent.
The likely result is that the incumbent will be voted out of office. Al-
though this particular phenomenon would occur whether the official
were an oldtimer or a newcomer, previously elected officials are
especially vulnerable during boom periods.
5. Transiency and crime
An aura of uncertainty pervades many boom communities. The
53. W. Andrews & W. Bauder, The Effects of Industrialization on a Rural County: A
Comparison of Social Change in Monroe and Noble Counties of Ohio (1967) (Dep't Series
407, Ohio Agricultural Research & Development Center).
54. R. Gold, supra note 42.
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constant shifts in both personal and institutional arrangements af-
fect both industry and the community. The changing behavioral norms
are adhered to by only limited segments of the total community at
any given time. Life becomes very difficult for many individuals as
they attempt to maintain order in their lives in the absence of firm
and widely accepted norms. 55
While oldtimers watch their familiar community change in
directions over which they may have no control, newcomers attempt
to adjust to a community they are in, but not of. The bulk of the in-
migrants to most boom towns are transients, either by choice or by
chance. The bulk of the in-migrants during the actual boom phase are
construction workers. They are notoriously mobile, moving from one
site to another. In a study of five energy impacted communities in
Montana, North Dakota, and Wyoming, Mountain West Research,
Inc.5 6 discovered that just over ten percent of the in-migrant con-
struction workers planned to remain in the community. Fifty-one
percent of those same workers indicated that they would stay only
until the job was completed. 57 Because their plans include only
temporary residence in a community, construction workers feel lit-
tle identification with the town. Home is where their trailers or mo-
bile homes are parked, and they can move on twenty-four hours' no-
tice. Home in the traditional sense of family, friends, and permanence,
if it exists at all, is located elsewhere.
Transient populations, both in the popular mind and in reality,
have come to be associated with high crime rates. Boom towns prove
no exception to the rule. Even though details of the types of crimes
committed in boom towns are generally not available, gross meas-
ures are illustrative of the severity of the problem. In Rock Springs,
Wyoming, Gilmore and Duff have reported that during 1972 and 1973,
complaints received by the police increased sixty percent. 58 The police
budget in Colstrip, Montana, was increased forty percent in one
year.59 Kohrs found that police expenditures in Gillette, Wyoming,
doubled between 1968 and 1971. °
The high crime rates in boom towns indicate not only a deteriora-
tion in the quality of life, but also present special problems for law
enforcement officials. Two such problems should be discussed. First,
with boom growth there is always the danger that a double standard
55. Norms can usefully be thought of as rules for behavior. In the social science litera-
ture, the state of normlessness is referred to as anomie. See Gold, supra note 42, for a
brief discussion of the changing of behavioral norms in Montana.
56. MWRI, supra note 7.
57. Id. at 54.
58. J. GILMORE & M. DuFr, supra note 5, at 14.
59. Hawks, supra note 25.
60. E. Kohrs, supra note 36. Because of municipal problems so prevalent in boom towns,
it is fair to assume that budget expenditures probably represent low estimates of the
crime rate.
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of law enforcement will develop,-one for oldtimers, and one for new-
comers. This is analogous to the problem faced by travelers pass-
ing through rural hamlets, except that in this instance, the travelers
are residents in the community, even if they are not of it. The ethi-
cal and legal implications of such a dual system are clear and need
not be discussed further.
Second, under boom conditions there is a breakdown of infor-
mal social controls. As the population increases, community residents
have even greater difficulty in effectively applying informal sanctions.
At a minimum, informal sanctions are effective only when shared
beliefs exist within the community. Many problems typically proc-
essed by metropolitan police departments are routinely handled in
rural villages through informal social pressures to effect confor-
mance with local law. Friends, relatives, and church leaders, acting
singly or in concert, pressure the wrongdoer to conform his behavior
with the norm, including both laws and local expectations.
Informal social control mechanisms cannot function effectively,
however, when population size precludes community residents from
becoming acquainted with one another. These mechanisms do not
function at all when the scope of shared beliefs and norms is extreme-
ly restricted, as in boom towns.
In the past rural police have been known to actively relinquish
police and court functions to friends, family or religious leaders of a
lawbreaker. Moreover, like the community, the police have frequent-
ly relied upon informal sanctions, such as a stiff lecture or a cuff
behind the ear, rather than upon more universally accepted police
procedures. But, as population increases during a boom and rural
communities become more urban, a perceptible shift in the atti-
tudes of the citizenry occurs, bringing into question the use of infor-
mal social controls. The source of this change is found in the urban
experiences of the in-migrants, many of whom have discovered
through personal experience that equal protection can be achieved
only through the application of universal criteria to all offenders. In
their view, a personalized justice system depends too heavily upon
social status, political power, and kin.
Unlike many other problems facing boom towns, the solution to
this boom-related problem is simple and straightforward. Prior to
the boom, police should be given specialized training similar to that
received in metropolitan police departments. Emphasis should be
placed upon dealing with all offenders in a professional, value neu-
tral and uniform manner which is in complete compliance with
codified laws. Such training, however, does not negate the need for
increased personnel and operating budgets, which must also precede
the boom period.
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IV. PAGE, ARIZONA: AN ATYPICAL BOOM TOWN
A. OVERVIEW
In the early 1950's Manson Mesa was an isolated, desolate, sun-
soaked and wind-swept area on the northwestern border of the Navajo
Reservation. From the top of the mesa one could look down upon the
Glen Canyon of the Colorado. The nearest paved road was U.S. 89,
approximately twenty miles to the southeast.
In August 1957 ground was broken in preparation for the con-
struction of the 900 megawatt Glen Canyon Dam hydroelectric facil-
ity. With the project came a radical alteration in the mesa land-
scape. Under the auspices of the Bureau of Reclamation, Page, Ari-
zona, was conceived, planned, and operated to provide housing and
municipal services for the government employees and construc-
tion workers at the site.6 1
A short four years after the completion and dedication of Glen
Canyon Dam, construction was begun on the 2,250 megawatt coal-
fired Navajo Generating Station. Thus in the span of just nine years,
two major electric generating facilities were begun. Both projects
stimulated population growth of truly epidemic proportions. Between
1957 and 1958, as construction on the dam began, Page's population
grew over 150%. Construction at the generating facility site led to a
growth rate of approximately the same magnitude during 1970 and
1971 (see Table 1) .62
Implicit in the notion of boom is the obverse: bust. Population de-
clines in various years between 1957 and 1976 were very nearly as
radical as the growth had been. Nevertheless, during the several
growth years, yearly growth rates nearly always -exceeded fifteen
percent. But Page is a unique community that has survived popula-
tion fluctuations which could have crippled normal communities.
Page is an atypical boom town not only because it has experienced
two booms in less than twenty years, but also because until March
1975 it was a federal community.
Prior to 1975, Page was under the sole jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Reclamation.6 3 With the exception of the schools, every aspect
of the community was under the direct control of the Bureau, and
hence the federal government. The Bureau controlled even the num-
61. Duffy, Page, Arizona: The Town a Dam Built, ARIZONA HIGHWAYS (Jan. 1964).
62. Unless otherwise noted, the data reported was obtained in the summer of 1974 from
an interview schedule administered to a random sample of heads of households in Page,
Ariz. and Kanab, Escalante, Blanding and Monticello, Utah.
63. See 43 C.F.R. § 409.1 (1975), adopted pursuant to Reclamation Project Act of
1939, ch. 418, § 15, 53 Stat. 1187, 1198 (codified in 43 U.S.C. § 485(1) (1970)). In 1964
a local citizens council was formed to serve in an advisory capacity to Bureau of Recla-
mation officials.
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Table 1. Average Population, Number of Crimes, and Percent Change
in Page, Arizona: 1957-76.



































































Source: Page, Arizona, City Offices, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
*Estimates using regression techniques from B. Ives, W. Schultze
& D. Brookshire, supra note 3.
**U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1 U.S. CENSUS OF THE POPULATION:
1970, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, Part 4, Ariz. (1973).
ber and nature of retail outlets acceptable in the fledgling commu-
nity.64 More important, however, is the fact that federal funds were
used for planning and installation of all municipal services. The Bu-
reau of Reclamation continued to subsidize the costs of municipal
services even after the municipal facilities were completed. For ex-
64. See 43 C.F.R. § 409.8 to .14 (1975).
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ample, the Bureau charged residents only about thirty-three percent
of the actual cost of delivering water to homes and businesses.6 5
Page was thus protected from the economic burdens of supply-
ing public services to a rapidly expanding population, even as in-
comes were augmented indirectly, for example, by the subsidized
utility rates. Given these factors, one might be tempted to label the
situation as idyllic and speculate that boom problems were non-ex-
istent in the town. Such has not been the case, however. Page, too,
has suffered from the same social problems faced by other boom
communities, even though the major economic burdens of expansion
were accepted by the federal government.
Like other one-industry towns, Page has suffered whenever the
industry has suffered. In 1959, construction on the dam was halted
by a strike. Part of the population was forced to leave during the
six-month absence of construction -employment and some businesses
were forced to shut down.6 6 More important and less expected, Page
has experienced interpersonal and interinstitutional conflicts just as
in other boom towns. This is all the more surprising, since all of
the residents were originally in-migrants. Also, because Page is such
a new town, traditions and social structures have had relatively little
time to coalesce and become rigid. Oldtimers in Page should better
understand the problems and worldviews of newcomers than long-
time residents of other western boom towns. They, better than most,
should especially understand the problems associated with transiency.
B. TRANSIENCY
The most obvious and readily obtained index of transiency is the
nature of housing in a community. Towns with a high proportion of
mobile residential units are more transient than communities with
a lower proportion of houses on wheels. As Table 2 indicates, Page
has an extremely high proportion of mobile housing units. Only in
the interim between the completion of the dam in 1966 and the begin-
ning of construction of the generating station in 1970 did the propor-
tion of mnhile units approach the percentage expected in a "normal"
community.6 7
in 1i14 the newcomers, those who arrived in Page after 1970, rep-
resented approximately 80% of the total population.' 8 Of those sam-
pled, nearly 95% of the newcomers stated they were residing in Page
65. Vickers, Page, Arizona: A Study of Factors Affecting Incorporation of a "Federal"
Community 7 (1968) (Public Affairs Bull. No. 3, Arizona State Univ.).
66. Duffy, supra note 61.
67. See B. Ives, W. Schultze & D. Brookshire, supra note 3.
68. Population estimates are based on a simple random sample of 70 household inter-
views. For a complete description of the research methods, see R. Little, Rural Industriali-
zation: The Four Corners Region In Energy Scarcity In America (1976) (unpublished pa-
per, Washington State Univ.).
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Table 2. Distribution of Trailers as
1960-1975.
Housing Units in Page, Arizona:
Reported
Year No. Units No. Trailers** % Trailers
1960* 866 569 65.7
1961 1549 1151 74.3
1962 1521 1126 74.0
1963 1313 905 68.9
1964 809 458 56.6
1965 488 165 33.8
1966 463 135 29.2
1967 375 68 18.1
1968 405 90 22.2
1971 995 471 47.3
1972 1618 1108 68.5
1973 2160 1564 72.4
19744 2090 1476 70.6
1975 1854 1234 66.6
Source: Page, Arizona, City Offices, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
*Figures are for month of June, except 1975 which was available
only for April.
**Includes mobile home and travel trailer which are permanent
dwellings.
for business or economic reasons, whereas only 57.1% of the oldtim-
ers gave economic reasons (see Table 3). The majority of oldtimers
and newcomers alike, 64 and 57% respectively, originally lived in one
of the Four Corners states (Utah, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mex-
ico) immediately prior to arriving in Page. However, only 2.9% of
the Page respondents had moved there from communities in the im-
mediate vicinity. More illustrative of the degree of transiency is the
fact that respondents indicated they had resided in an average of
12.6 communities before moving to Page, with newcomers averaging
14.6 and oldtimers averaging 5.7. Thus, the newcomers were even
more transient than the oldtimers who had migrated to Page between
1957 and 1969.
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*Includes employment transfers and retail trade activities.
**Oldtimers are those residents who arrived in Page prior to 1970
and the construction of Navajo Generating Station.
Further evidence of the high level of transiency in Page is pro-
vided in Table 4, which shows that 60.7% of the newcomers and
42.9% of the oldtimers plan on remaining in the community only un-
til the job ends. Again, both groups are transient, but the newcom-
ers are more transient.




Remain as long as job lasts
Remain until obtain a better job
Remain until retirement












*Oldtimers are those residents who arrived in Page
and the construction of Navajo Generating Station.
prior to 1970
In the period between the construction of the dam and the gen-
erating station, Page's population appears to have changed very little.
Today's newcomers resemble newcomers of fifteen years ago accord-
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ing to descriptions of the population at that time.69 The same dis-
tinctions between Bureau of Reclamation personnel, merchants, and
construction/energy company personnel can be made today as were
made then, except that the importance of Bureau of Reclamation
personnel has decreased as their numbers have decreased. Many res-
idents still do not identify strongly with the community, undoubtedly
due in part to its transient nature. Transiency, then, remains one
source of intercommunity conflicts and schisms.
C. COMMUNITY CONFLICTS
Status distinctions made by Page residents were obvious in 1974,
even if local leaders attempted to mask them.7 0 The divisions were
between oldtimers and newcomers, with each group ranking itself
above the other. Oldtimers seemed to base their estimates of status
on permanency and respectability, while newcomers generally relied
on income.7 1 Thus, moral and economic worth were the major yard-
sticks for measuring status, with each group using a different cri-
terion. The ranking criterion used by the oldtimers seemed to gen-
erate the greater hostility, at least as evidenced by the surprising
number of unsolicited comments made by newcomers during inter-
views. The newcomers did not feel they were receiving either proper
respect or fair treatment in the local retail outlets.
The battle line for the conflict was drawn between the construc-
tion workers with high wages and the local merchants. This dichot-
omy very nearly coincides with the newcomer-,oldtimer distinction,
and for convenience will be treated as identical. In any event, the
local merchants resented the fact that they had difficulty in obtain-
ing a labor force because of the higher wages available at the gen-
erating station, while the construction workers thought they were
being "gouged" by the merchants. Part of the worker response was
to purchase relatively large proportions of their goods in other com-
munities.7 2
This behavior cannot be attributed solely to the attitude of the
workers, however. Prices in Page were generally higher than those
* 69. H. Frost, Successful Transiency-Some Findings from the Page, Arizona Community
Research Project (1961) (unpublished paper, Univ. of Utah) ; T. Smith & B. Sharda, Mi-
gration and Belongingness: The Emergence of a Community (1976) (unpublished paper.
Univ. of Utah) ; Williams, Frost & Sibley, Page, Arizona-A Rootless Community, 37 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE UTAH ACAD. OF Sci., ARTS AND LETTERS 97-101 (1959-1960).
70. In extended interviews with community leaders they denied or soft-pedaled distinc-
tions between newcomers and oldtimers, even though Interviews with other community
residents forced the conclusion that the distinction was real and critical.
71. The median annual family income for newcomers was $20,938, while for oldtlmers
it was $18,333. The median for the combined groups was $20,635.
72. For a discussion of commodity purchasing patterns for residents in the Lake Powell
Region, see R. Krannich, An Analysis of Factors Contributing to Rural Economic Under-
development in the Lake Powell Area (1977) (unpublished masters thesis, Utah State
Univ.).
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in the surrounding communities. For example, grocery prices in Page
were almost twenty-three percent higher than in Flagstaff, Arizona,
and almost two percent higher than in nearby Kanab, a community
less than half the size of Page.73 Although the phenomenon of pur-
chasing groceries, in communities other than the one of residence is
not unusual, it is exaggerated in Page.
The community split was perhaps aggravated when it was trans-
ferred from the interpersonal to the institutional level. The dispute
focused on' a ten million dollar school bond issue which was approved
by the citizenry. Oldtimers and newcomers alike frequently claimed
that newcomers voted for the issue in order to spite the permanent
residents.7 4 Some even speculated that the school superintendent
was hired for the express purpose of passing the bonds.
The truth or falsity of the accusations is unimportant. What is
important is that conflicts arose between oldtimers and newcomers,
which had serious consequences for both groups. The importance of
the conflict is indicated by the attempts of leaders to mask the con-
flict.7 5 These examples point to a problem faced in most boom towns:
integrating new residents into the existing social structure. The evi-
dence indicates that Page, even with the experience of the Glen Can-
yon Dam construction period as a lesson, was unable to learn from it
and avoid all of the problems created by a new influx of people.
D. CRIME
A community with a rapidly growing population that is not inte-
grated into the social structure and is highly transient, that is, a
boom town, would be expected to experience an increase in crime,
rates. In this respect, Page is not atypical. Data for every year
back to 1957 is unavailable, but data for 1960, 1965, and 1970 through
1974 is presented in Table 1 along with population data. The rela-
tionship between crime and population growth is presented in Fig-
ure 1. It can be seen in Figure 1 that the increases in crime and
population are roughly parallel.7 6 The rates of increase each year
vary considerably, with population increasing more rapidly than
crime in some years and less rapidly in others. For example, from
1970 to 1971, as construction activities on the Navajo Generating
Station began, the annual number of crimes increased 118.7%
while the population increased 150.4%. But, the percentage of increase
73. Id. See also P. Polzin, supra note 29, for a general discussion of this phenomenon.
74. For a discussion of bond indebtedness extending beyond the life of a dam construc-
tion work force in Sweet Home, Oregon, see Smith, Hogg & Regan, supra note 31.
75. See note 70 supra.
76. The Pearson's Product-Moment Correlation Coefficient for population and crime is
.72. It should be noted that the scales for population and crime in Figure 1 are not identi-
cal, but this scaling difficulty was necessary for graphic reasons.
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Figure 1. Population and Crime Statistics for Page, Arizona:
1957-1976.
Sources: U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, I U.S. CENSUS OF THE POPULATION:
1970, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, Part 4, Ariz. (1970).
Regression estimates from B. Ives, W. Schultze & D. Brookshire,
supra note 3. Crime statistics from Page Police Dep't 1976 (Page,
Ariz.).
from 1971 to 1972 was higher for crimes (63.7%) than for population
(55.9%) .7
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There can be no doubt that rapid population growth has in the
past created social problems which have made the lives of thousands
of Americans less enjoyable than they should have been. As Kohrs
has noted, "The history of power production-synonymous with 'boom
development'-in Wyoming is a dismal record of human ecosystem
wastage. Frontier expansion without adequate planning has left cities
crippled by shameful environments which cause human casualties.
' 7 8
77. In all likelihood, the .crime statistics during growth periods under-represent the
true number of crimes committed. Since crime increases more rapidly than police capacity
to control it, police officers are inclined to ignore the less serious offenses in order to
focus on more serious crimes.
78. E. Kohrs, supra note 36, at 1.
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Industry is also confronted with problems stemming from boom de-
velopments. For example, as living conditions deteriorate, employees
are absent more often and quit with greater frequency, thereby re-
ducing productivity.79
Given the obvious social and less obvious industry costs, why
then do boom towns and their resultant problems persist? It would
seem such a simple matter to eliminate rapid population build-ups
by stretching the construction period over a longer period of time
so fewer employees would be necessary at any given time. As an
additional benefit, employees would be able to remain at one site
for a longer period of time, thereby increasing the likelihood that
they would gain a sense of community identification and integration.
Industry would not, however, find this solution acceptable. The
economic costs of lowered productivity due to unfavorable living con-
ditions appear to be more than offset by the savings attained by
compressing the construction period into as short a time period as
possible. The savings result from reduced interest accumulations on
loans for salaries and wages.80 The present national mania over en-
ergy self-sufficiency would also conflict with this solution.
If economics and ideology preclude lengthening the construction
phase on energy projects, then the focus must continue to be upon
planning to avoid problems, 'or if problems are unavoidable, to mit-
igate them. Unfortunately, however, planning for the social conse-
quences of boom towns has, on the whole, been greatly neglected.
In spite of the important interrelationships between natural, economic,
and social environments, the major focus of most studies intended
as tools for decision-makers has been limited largely to the former
two categories. The Page example makes amply clear the conclu-
sion that social problems exist even when planning and front-end
money has been provided for the impacted community.
The reason why the social aspects of the boom phenomenon have
been so largely ignored is not entirely clear, but at least part of the
answer is to be found in political decisions to allocate greater re-
sources to problems of the natural and economic environments. What-
ever the reasons, elected officials, planners, and ordinary citizens
alike appear to pay little heed to the social consequences of boom
growth. Some of the issues that are virtually ignored include whether
family life is strengthened or weakened, whether the elderly are re-
spected or eschewed, or whether life in boom towns is above'or be-
low acceptable standards.
EIS's are a prime example of the tendency to ignore potential
79. See Gilmore. supra note 2; J. GILMORE & M. DUFF, supra note 5. But see B. Ives,
W. Schultze & D. Brookshire, supra note 3, who view this problem slightly differently.
80. B. Ives, W. Schultze & D. Brookshire, supra note 3.
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social consequences. They typically pay only superficial attention to
the social impacts a proposed development might engender. Unlike
assessments of the possible impacts upon the natural environment,
social impact assessments almost never utilize data collected specif-
ically to answer the questions at hand. Instead, if data is used at all,
it is primarily nothing more than demographic information available
from federal and state agencies, which only infrequently provides
answers to the questions asked. In fact, the use of available data
tends to direct attention away from questions that need to be an-
swered and re-directs it towards questions that can be answered. 1
The end result of this practice is that social impact sections of
EIS's give the appearance of being afterthoughts, included merely to
satisfy the formal requirements of NEPA.8 2 This suspicion is con-
firmed when it is noted that available social science literature does not
appear to have been consulted. Admittedly, much of the literature
is frequently unpublished, or is published in little-known sources. It
is nevertheless available. Extensive work on rural industrialization
has been done, and much of it is directly related to energy develop-
ment. By ignoring such literature, including useful theories found
therein, not only do known solutions go unheeded, but known ques-
tions go unasked.
So long as the assessment of social problems resulting from en-
ergy development continues on its present course, boom town prob-
lems will continue. Persons who, by either choice or chance, reside
in energy rich areas will be subjected to living conditions which
persons in more urban locations would find quite intolerable. Long-
time residents must accept the new conditions or move, leaving
friends, family, and traditions. Among in-migrants, the options are
no better. Many possess skills which are dependent upon large-scale
construction, such as energy projects; thus, they have little choice
but to accept conditions as they find them or seek new occupations.
The alternatives for in-migrants and oldtime residents are the same:
either accept living conditions which are marginal or surrender cher-
ished objects or activities.
In order to eliminate or mitigate the boom problems associated
with large-scale energy projects, decision-makers and planners must
be armed with adequate social impact assessments which satisfy the
spirit as well as the letter of NEPA. Although this will require more
time, money and effort, Americans can ill-afford to ignore such press-
ing and important issues any longer.
81. Current environmental impact statements are vivid examples of this. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 18.
82. The EIS requirements of NEPA are set out at note 17 supra.

